Governments are confronted with the growing realization that they face …scal limits on the size of debt and de…cits relative to GDP. These …scal limits invalidate Bohn's criterion for …scal sustainability, which allows explosive debt relative to GDP, eventually violating any …scal limit. We derive restrictions on a …scal rule, necessary for the government to eliminate explosive behavior. These restrictions require that the response of the primary surplus to debt be relatively strong, and that the primary surplus be cointegrated with both debt and output. We test these empirical implications for a panel of eleven EMU countries, and …nd that they are satis…ed, implying that …scal policy does not create explosive behavior.
Introduction
Fiscal authorities are facing renewed scrutiny over government debt and de…cits following the worldwide recession and …nancial crisis that began in 2007. The scrutiny has been especially intense in European Monetary Union (EMU) countries, where …scal problems have threatened the value of the Euro, and raised the specters of both sovereign default and a breakup of the monetary union. What is "responsible" …scal policy, and have countries in the EMU been following such a policy?
The design of responsible monetary policy has received much more attention than that of responsible …scal policy. Monetary policy is typically speci…ed as a rule, often a Taylor Rule, and alternative policies involve consideration of alternative speci…cations of the rule. Leeper (2010) argues that we need to place …scal policy under the same scrutiny. Speci…cally, we need to specify …scal policy as a rule, determine criteria for the …scal rule to be responsible, and test whether countries meet those criteria.
A responsible …scal rule must be sustainable. Early tests of …scal sustainability (Hamilton and Flavin, 1986; Wilcox, 1989; Trehan and Walsh, 1991) focused either on determining whether debt was stationary or on cointegration between government debt and the primary surplus as indicative of whether current …scal policy satis…ed the intertemporal budget constraint, and hence was sustainable. However, Bohn (2007) argued that sustainability tests based on cointegration were unnecessarily restrictive. This is because a …scal policy could be sustainable with a growing gap between government debt and the primary surplus, in violation of cointegration. He demonstrates that the government's intertemporal budget constraint is expected to hold under a …scal rule in which the primary surplus adjusts by any positive amount to lagged debt. Therefore, Bohn (1998 Bohn ( , 2008 claims that a …scal policy, characterized as a rule with the primary surplus responding positively to lagged debt, is sustainable.
However, Bohn's (1998 Bohn's ( , 2008 Sims, 1997) . This literature recognizes that there is an upper bound on the value of the primary surplus that a country can raise. A …scal limit is in part due to the La¤er Curve; since taxes are distortionary, there is an upper bound on the level of taxes a country can raise (Trabandt and Uhlig, 2011) . It also arises due to political will. There is an upper bound on a country's willingness to tax itself and a lower bound on expenditures on public goods. In the presence of these …scal limits, explosive debt and primary surpluses, which satisfy the intertemporal budget constraint, do not represent equilibrium paths because they will eventually violate any upper bound.
Therefore, a responsible …scal rule must do more than satisfy the government's intertemporal budget constraint. It must also rule out explosive behavior of debt and the primary surplus relative to GDP. Bohn (2007) acknowledges that his analysis abstracts from …scal limits. Our paper can be viewed as an extension of Bohn, necessary when countries face …scal limits.
We de…ne a responsible …scal rule as satisfying the government's intertemporal budget constraint and ruling out explosive behavior. We specify a simple …scal policy rule, analogous to the Taylor Rule for monetary policy, and derive the restrictions on parameters necessary for the …scal rule to be responsible. Satisfaction of the intertemporal budget constraint requires that the primary surplus respond positively to lagged debt, as in Bohn (1998 Bohn ( , 2008 . Ruling out explosive behavior adds the requirement that the debt and primary surplus eventually stabilize relative to output. Together these restrictions require that a responsible …scal rule yield a globally stable system. 1 We derive two empirically testable criteria which a responsible …scal rule must satisfy.
The …rst is that the magnitude of the responsiveness of the primary surplus to lagged debt must be large enough to yield global stability. The second is cointegration. Since the primary surplus and debt are expected to reach a long-run equilibrium in a globally stable model, consideration of non-explosive behavior, required by …scal limits, restores cointegration between the primary surplus and debt as a necessary requirement for a responsible …scal rule.
When the …scal rule must satisfy the intertemporal budget constraint in addition to ruling out explosive behavior, the requirement for cointegration is not unnecessarily strong.
We conduct tests to assess our two empirically testable criteria, using annual data on real debt, real primary surpluses, and real GDP for a panel of eleven EMU countries over the period 1970-2011. We …nd that …scal policy was adequately responsive to increases in debt, and that the data exhibits the required cointegration to imply that the …scal rule has been responsible in our panel of eleven EMU countries.
A …scal rule which satis…es our criteria for responsibility is necessary, but not su¢ cient, for …scal solvency for two primary reasons. First, a responsible …scal rule eliminates explosive behavior of debt as long as the government can achieve the primary surplus mandated by the rule. Stochastic shocks could send debt so high that the surpluses, mandated by …scal rule which brings debt back down, would violate …scal limits and are therefore infeasible. (Daniel and Shiamptanis, 2012) . At the …scal limit, the government cannot raise surpluses further to continue its responsible …scal rule. Agents refuse to lend, creating a solvency crisis. 2 Second, any test based on historical data is necessarily backward-looking. Politicians can make future promises, unrelated to current values of the primary surplus and debt, which are insolvent, and …nd themselves unable to borrow to carry out those plans. Davig et al. (2010 ) are concerned about unfunded future liabilities due to age-related spending. Historical data does not capture this kind of future plan. Current projections for future debts levels are so high that if agents truly believed that no adjustments would be make to deal with the unfunded liabilities, then governments would be insolvent in spite of having followed a responsible …scal rule in the past.
Therefore, a county following a responsible …scal rule could still encounter solvency problems due to negative shocks or due to future plans which are insolvent. However, a country following a …scal rule which is not responsible will encounter solvency problems with cer- 2 Polito and Wickens (2012) have similar objectives. They evaluate the future …scal stance of current policy by determining whether the forecast debt/GDP ratio over a particular horizon, using VAR, is consistent with a target debt/GDP ratio. They use a VAR to forecast future debt, rather than a …scal rule. They are interested in the measure of …scal stance whereas Daniel and Shiamptanis (2012) are interested in …scal solvency.
tainty.
3 This is what we seek to determine with our tests. We are testing for responsibility which requires non-explosive behavior of government debt and the primary surplus relative to GDP.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 derives the restrictions on the parameters of the …scal rule necessary for a responsible …scal policy. Section 3 contains the empirical analysis, and Section 4 provides conclusions.
Derivation of Model Restrictions
In this section, we derive criteria for the …scal rule such that the government's intertemporal budget constraint holds, and debt and the primary surplus are not expected to explode relative to output. We label this …scal rule responsible.
Fiscal Rule
We use a simple speci…cation for the …scal rule, analogous to the Taylor Rule for monetary policy. Our …scal rule generalizes those originally introduced by Leeper (1991) by allowing the primary surplus (s t ) to respond to its own lag and to lagged output (y t 1 ) ; in addition to lagged debt (b t 1 ). The …scal rule is given by
where all variables are expressed in real terms, and t is a mean-zero disturbance representing …scal shocks. Fiscal shocks re ‡ect both politically-determined shocks to taxes or government spending, and the responses of the …scal authority to other shocks that a¤ect the economy.
The lagged value of the primary surplus is necessary to …t the data. It allows persistence and re ‡ects the desire to smooth the e¤ect of shocks over time. Bohn (1998 Bohn ( , 2008 shows that the primary surplus must respond positively to lagged debt for the …scal rule to satisfy the intertemporal budget constraint. In a model with all variables growing, the response to lagged output replaces the constant in Leeper's …scal rule.
Evolution of the government debt
The evolution of the government debt is derived by combining asset market equilibrium with the government's ‡ow budget constraint. We assume that the countries in the monetary union are small enough that they cannot a¤ect the world price level or world interest rate.
There is a single good in the world, implying goods markets equilibrium requires the law of one price. Normalizing the world price level at unity and assuming no world in ‡ation implies that the equilibrium price level in the monetary union is the exchange rate.
We assume that international creditors are willing to buy and sell a country's government bonds as long as its nominal interest rate, r t , satis…es interest rate parity. Interest rate parity is implied by the Euler equations for a representative world agent when the covariance of the country's interest rate with world-agent consumption is zero, or when the world agent is risk neutral. Under the additional assumption that the world interest rate (r) is constant, interest rate parity can be expressed as
where E t denotes the expectation conditional on time t information, P t denotes the common price level in the monetary union, and t+1 is the fraction of the value of the country's bond that will be repaid in period t + 1.
Consider the government ‡ow budget constraint. Letting B t , M t , G t , and T t , denote, respectively, nominal government bonds held by the public, money supply supported by the country's bonds, government spending, and tax revenue, the country's nominal ‡ow government budget constraint is given by
Dividing by P t , the real values of debt and the primary surplus can be expressed respectively as
The government's real ‡ow budget constraint can be expressed as
where t = Pt P t 1 1 is the in ‡ation rate.
To solve the model, we express current debt as a linear function of lagged debt and the current primary surplus by isolating the term containing the capital loss on government debt.
De…ne t as the capital loss on debt due to in ‡ation or default as
If there is no in ‡ation ( t = 0) and no default ( t = 1), then there is no capital loss ( t = 0).
But if t > 0 or t < 1, then t > 0. Unanticipated capital loss can be expressed as
Using equations (3) and (4), and imposing interest rate parity from equation (2), the evolution of debt can be expressed as
where b t includes publicly held government bonds and the money supply backed by the country's bonds, r is the world real interest rate, and ( t E t 1 t ) represents the unanticipated capital loss, due to in ‡ation or default, on the country's debt. Expectations of capital loss (E t 1 t ) raise the country's interest rate above the world rate, and when the actual capital loss ( t ) does not occur, debt accumulates in response to the higher interest rate. Higher in ‡ation, when fully anticipated, raises t and E t 1 t equally, thereby having no e¤ect on the evolution of government debt. The increase in the nominal interest rate, created by the increase in expected in ‡ation, is exactly o¤set by the capital loss on government debt due to the actual in ‡ation. 4 Substituting for the primary surplus from equation (1) yields
Together, equations (1) and (6) constitute a dynamic system in the primary surplus and debt as a function of output, the …scal shock, and unanticipated capital loss on government debt with all variables expressed in real terms.
Fiscal Limits
World-wide increases in government debt relative to GDP have sparked interest in a new literature on …scal limits, where these limits are endogenous to a country's economic and political system and have no relation to the limits imposed in the EMU or any other limits imposed exogenously on a government. These internal …scal limits recognize that there is an upper bound to the tax revenue that can be raised because taxes are distortionary; Our paper considers the implications of …scal limits for responsible …scal rules.
Leeper (2010) de…nes the …scal limit as the point at which the government can no longer raise taxes or reduce spending and transfers. In models without growth and with an exogenous path for government spending and transfers, he models the …scal limit as a …xed value for taxes. We generalize Leeper and do not assume exogenous government spending and transfers. This leads us to express the …scal limit in terms of the primary surplus. Following
Bi (2012), we assume that there is an upper bound on the present value of the future primary surplus (s t ) relative to output (y t ) that a government can raise.
Letting g denote the rate of growth of output, de…ne
; as the gross growthadjusted interest rate factor. We specify the …scal limit as requiring that the present value of primary surpluses relative to output, discounted at the growth-adjusted interest rate, be less than an upper bound according to
where ' max has the interpretation as the maximum value for the surplus relative to output if this value were constant. Combining the government's intertemporal budget constraint, derived by solving equation (5) forward, with the upper bound on the present value of primary surpluses yields an upper bound on debt according to
We can illustrate that Bohn's criterion for intertemporal budget balance does not rule out explosive behavior, required by …scal limits. Setting 1 = 2 = 0 in equation (6) to simplify and solving forward to obtain the value of debt N periods ahead yields
Satisfaction of the government's intertemporal budget constraint requires that the present value of debt be zero in the limit, explicitly
5 If the growth rate were constant at g, the limit on debt would simplify to b t < y t 1+g r g ' max :
A positive response of the primary surplus to lagged debt, 3 > 0, is su¢ cient to imply that debt grows more slowly than interest, yielding a zero limit and intertemporal budget balance. However, a small value for 3 allows debt to grow faster than output such that debt relative to output grows forever and eventually violates any value for ' max . 6 Davig (2005) also notes that the government's intertemporal budget constraint could be satis…ed with an exploding debt relative to GDP, although he does not explicitly consider …scal limits. Our purpose is to derive constraints on the more general …scal rule, equation (1), to assure that debt does not grow faster than output in the limit.
The value for ' max could be stochastic as in Bi (2012), or heterogenous across countries as in Trabandt and Uhlig (2011) . What matters in deriving restrictions for a responsible …scal rule is the existence of a …scal limit, not its magnitude or its time-varying behavior.
If the value of debt relative to GDP is explosive, then the magnitude of the …scal limit is not important because debt will eventually violate any …nite limit. If we were interested in predicting a …scal solvency crisis, as in Daniel and Shiamptanis (2012) , then the magnitude of the …scal limit, compared with the current values for debt and the primary surplus, would be important. The focus of this paper is on one necessary criterion for solvency -a …scal rule which eliminates explosive behavior.
Dynamics
To complete the model, we specify output dynamics. Consistent with our empirical evidence,
we specify output to be integrated of order one, giving the system a unit root. Output is 6 We assume r > g: Otherwise, the government does not face a binding budget constraint.
determined by
where 0 < < 1 is the autocorrelation in output growth, 0 < g < 1 is the average long-run growth rate of output and t is a mean-zero output shock. Our assumption, that output is an independent integrated stochastic process, is consistent with a model in which output is driven by integrated exogenous technology shocks. Therefore, we are assuming that the primary surplus has no impact on output. In the macro literature, the sign of this e¤ect is controversial and model speci…c. Our speci…cation should be viewed as a simpli…cation, which is standard in the literature on …scal sustainability, 7 and consistent with at least one mainstream macroeconomic model.
In the long-run, all the variables in the system grow at the average growth rate of output (g). To solve for this, quasi-di¤erence equations (1) and (6), to yield
Setting these equations to zero and solving, with shocks taking on their expected values of zero, yields long-run relationships
where
and where ' has the interpretation of the long-run value of the primary surplus relative to GDP. In the long-run, the primary surplus and debt both grow at the average rate of growth of output, and the primary surplus is proportional to output and to debt, with the factor of proportionality to debt expressed as the growth-adjusted interest rate.
Using equation (10), equations (8) and (9) can be rearranged and written in error correction form as
The expressions in square brackets are the cointegrating vectors, equivalently the long-run relationships, given by equations (10) . The error correction form implies that when the system deviates from its long-run conditions, the primary surplus and debt both adjust to these deviations. If the adjustment is in the correct direction and large enough, then the system is globally stable. A globally stable system is expected to return to long-run values.
Therefore, a system which returns to these long-run relationships does not allow the primary surplus relative to output to grow forever, ruling out explosive behavior, and does not allow debt to grow forever relative to the primary surplus, implying intertemporal budget balance.
To determine the restrictions necessary for global stability, we need to solve the dynamic system, expressed in terms of the cointegrating vectors and the long-run relationship for output. De…ne Y t and B t as deviations from cointegrating vectors and t as the deviation of output from its long-run growth relation according to
Rewrite the dynamic system, comprised of equations (7), (12), and (13) in terms of Y t , B t and t
Letting denote the roots of the system above, the characteristic equation is
Using equation (11) to substitute for '; the characteristic equation simpli…es to
Given that is less than one 8 , the system is globally stable if the remaining roots are also less than one in absolute value. There are multiple distinct sets of restrictions on 1 and Both roots can be within the unit circle only if their product is within the unit circle.
This requirement yields an upper bound on 1 as
Adding the requirement that the roots be real yields an upper bound on 3 as
When 1 and 3 are positive and satisfy both (14) and (15), then the stability criterion is given by
In a globally stable system, the values of Y t , B t and t are expected to approach zero in the limit. Equivalently, deviations from the cointegrating vectors vanish, and the system reaches the long-run relationships, given in equation (10) . Equation (16) implies that the responsiveness of the primary surplus to lagged debt, given by 3 ; must be larger than the real interest rate times one minus the persistence in the primary surplus. A positive, 9 If the largest root is less than unity, then both roots are inside the unit circle. The largest root is less than unity if
Assume the right-hand side is positive and square both sides to obtain
Simplifying yields r (1 1 ) < 3 : Note that with 3 and 1 restricted by their upper bounds, the right-hand side of the second equation above is indeed positive, as assumed. but weak response, implies that any initial deviations from cointegrating relationships will explode over time, violating any …nite …scal limit.
Consider the implications of the model solution for the intertemporal government budget constraint and …scal limits. For positive values of the coe¢ cients and for 3 satisfying equation (15) , the restrictions in equations (16) and (14) yield a system which is expected to reach long-run relationships, given by equations (10) . These restrictions assure intertemporal budget balance and rule out explosive behavior. Alternatively, if both restrictions are not satis…ed, then initial deviations from the cointegrating relationships are expected to grow forever. Growth of the primary surplus relative to output violates the …scal limit, no matter how large the limit is, while growth of deviations of the primary surplus from debt service might or might not violate Bohn's (1998 Bohn's ( , 2008 ) criterion for …scal sustainability.
The introduction of …scal limits brings the literature on …scal sustainability full circle.
Earlier work on …scal sustainability, summarized by Trehan and Walsh (1991) , de…ned sustainability as satisfaction of the government's intertemporal budget constraint and argued that it required a primary surplus responsiveness to debt at least as large as the interest rate. Bohn (1998 Bohn ( , 2008 demonstrated that any positive responsiveness would su¢ ce because the intertemporal budget constraint did not require boundedness of the debt. However, …scal limits require boundedness. When we add boundedness, we restore original criteria that the response of the primary surplus to lagged debt must be large enough. Our magnitudes di¤er only because we have added additional terms to the …scal rule. When 1 = 0; as assumed in earlier work, our restrictions reduce to the earlier one, where the primary surplus must respond to lagged debt by more than the real interest rate.
A disclaimer is necessary. We are not testing whether …scal policy is active or passive.
When non-explosive equilibria exist under each regime, observable equilibrium conditions are equivalent, invalidating any tests which attempt to distinguish (Cochrane, 1998) . Explicitly, government debt and the primary surplus must be cointegrated whether …scal policy is active or passive. Additionally, a positive coe¢ cient on lagged debt does not imply that the primary surplus responds to lagged debt. This is because debt can increase in equilibrium only if future primary surpluses are expected to increase. Therefore, the coe¢ cient on debt could be positive even if the …scal authority does not respond to debt. Rather, we assume that …scal policy is passive and that the …scal authority follows a rule under which it responds to lagged debt and other variables. Conditional on the assumption that the …scal authority responds to debt, we ask "Does it respond enough for the equilibrium to be non-explosive?"
Empirical Results
The purpose of the empirical work is to test whether the …scal rule characterizing policy in the EMU has been responsible. Our analysis yields two testable criteria: 1) the existence of cointegrating relationships between the primary surplus and debt, and between the primary surplus and output; and 2) a large enough response of the primary surplus to lagged debt to yield global stability for the dynamic system. If the …scal rule is responsible, then both criteria should be satis…ed. We test both, obtaining consistent results. Additionally, estimation of the parameters of the …scal rule provides parameter values which researchers can use to either calibrate the …scal rule or forecast future values for debt and the primary surplus.
We have annual data on the real primary surplus, s it , real debt, b it , and real GDP, y it , for the period of forty-two years (1970-2011) for a panel of eleven EMU countries. 10 We use panel techniques to provide estimates of the parameters. Panels increase power, The model is comprised of variables which can take on positive and negative values, but which also exhibit non-stationary geometric growth. This requires decisions on estimation.
The standard way of dealing with geometric trends using logarithms is not available to us since the primary surplus does take on negative values. Bohn (1998 Bohn ( , 2008 ) and Mendoza and Ostry (2008) transform the variables by dividing by output. We chose not to make this transformation for several reasons. First, such a transformation should eliminate the unit root in the data, invalidating the use of cointegration tests between the primary surplus and debt as a criterion for a responsible …scal rule.
11 Second, the transformation makes the coe¢ cients in the …scal rule stochastic, with values depending on the realization of 10 The countries were chosen based on data availability. They include Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. For more details see the Data Appendix. 11 Recently, Berenguer-Rico and Carrion-I-Silvestre (2011) also use real variables instead of variables expressed as a percentage of GDP, allowing exploitation of the non-stationary characteristics of the series through multicointegration.
the stochastic output growth rate. Third, Bohn (1998 Bohn ( , 2008 
Time Series Characteristics of Data
Before we proceed with the estimation of cointegration and error correction, we establish that the variables behave as unit root processes, I (1). We use panel unit root tests, which have more power than the time series unit root tests. The tests, reported in Table 1 , are computed using one lag and they include an individual speci…c constant and trend. All the tests fail to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root in s it , b it ; and y it at the 5 percent level, implying that real primary surplus, real debt and real output are I (1).
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Cointegration
Given that the variables in the …scal rule appear to behave as unit root processes, we test for the existence of long-run relationships using panel cointegration techniques. We estimate the following cointegrating model
and test for the existence of cointegrating relationships between the real primary surplus and real debt, and between the real primary surplus and real GDP. In equation (17), a i denotes the country speci…c …xed e¤ects, s it is the real primary surplus, x it is the regressor, b it or y it , and i is the cointegrating parameter, r i or' i . 13 Since countries can have di¤erent …scal rules, we model heterogeneity across countries by allowing each country's policy parameters to di¤er randomly from the EMU panel policy parameters. Letting i be the i th country's vector of parameters, and the vector of EMU parameters, we assume that i = + i , where the i have zero-means and constant variances for all i.
We begin with two group-mean panel cointegration t tests suggested by Pedroni (1999 Pedroni ( , 2004 where the …rst test is the null q = 0: If this hypothesis is rejected, then the null q = 1 is tested.
The sequential procedure continues until the null is not rejected or the hypothesis q = 2 is 15 Common time e¤ects allow us to model a limited form of cross-sectional dependence and cross-member cointegration (which is a form of long-run cross-sectional dependence). Common time e¤ects assume that the cross-sectional dependence correlation between country i and j is identical for all i; j. Thus, in the presence of heterogeneous cross-sectional dependence, subtracting o¤ the cross-sectional average does not completely eliminate cross-sectional dependence. The method by which cross-sectional dependence is modeled in panels is still an active area of research. Bai and Ng (2002) and Moon and Perron (2004) consider models in which the error terms have a factor structure in panel unit root tests, however the implications for such factor models have not been studied in the panel cointegration context. Notice though that time e¤ects are a special case of a factor model where there is a single common factor and the response of each country is similar. Therefore, time e¤ects account for both cross-sectional dependence and cross-member cointegration when the source of dependency is due to a single common time speci…c shock such as a common global business cycle shock. 16 We also reject the null of no cointegration at the 5 percent level when we use all seven panel statistics of Pedroni (1999 Pedroni ( , 2004 . Additionally, we reject the null of no cointegration at the 5 percent level when we do not use the common time e¤ects.
rejected. The test is computed using one lag in …rst di¤erences and it includes individual speci…c …xed e¤ects. In Table 3 
Fiscal Response to Debt
Finally, we test whether the magnitude of the response of the primary surplus to lagged debt has been large enough to satisfy restrictions necessary for global stability, given by equations (16) . Appendix A provides a derivation of the error correction model, under the assumption in the estimation that the data has a linear trend, yielding
where g i is average change in output, and' i is a combination of the parameters in the …scal rule such that' i g i has the interpretation of the long-run average change in the primary surplus. We estimate the parameters of the above error correction model using a two-step procedure, in which we initially estimate the cointegrating parameters. In the second step, we estimate the coe¢ cients on the error correction terms.
To estimate the cointegrating parameters, we use Pedroni's (2001) group-mean dynamic OLS (DOLS) procedure for cointegrated panels, which is based on equation (17). 17 The group-mean DOLS procedure accommodates the heterogeneity that is typically present both in the transitional serial correlation dynamics and in the long-run cointegrating relationships.
It is a parametric approach that adjusts for the e¤ects of endogenous regressors and short-run dynamics of the errors by using lead and lag di¤erences of the regressor. 18 We account for the cross-sectional dependence between the countries using common time e¤ects as suggested by Pedroni (2000 Pedroni ( , 2001 . Table 4 indicates that the group-mean panel estimates of the cointegrating parameters are r = 0:0445 and' = 0:0379.
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In the …nal step we consider estimation of the group-mean panel …scal rule parameters
; and 3 r . It is important to recognize that the residuals in equation (18) could be autocorrelated in the data. If so, then the residuals could be correlated with the right-handside variables, biasing estimates of the coe¢ cients on the error correction terms. Also, a 17 Bohn (2008) considers a similar equation to (17) with x it given by debt, using over two centuries of US data on the primary surplus, output, and debt. His real data series have severe heteroskedasticiy, due to two centuries of growth in real GDP. He reduces, but does not eliminate, these problems by dividing by real GDP. Standard deviations for real variables are 64 to 98 times as high in the second period as in the …rst. For variables expressed as a fraction of GDP, this number falls to about 2. We have a very di¤erent data set from Bohn's -a relatively short time dimension and eleven countries. The shorter time dimension implies that we do not have Bohn's heteroskedasticity problem. Ratios of standard deviations in the second half of the sample relative to the …rst half average to about 2, similar to his adjusted data. 18 Since DOLS is designed to reduce bias associated with short-run dynamics and the estimates in equation (17) are super-consistent, it is not necessary to add stationary variables, like HP-…ltered measures of the data, as in Bohn's model with stationary data (2008) . 19 The DOLS results are robust to the choice of leads and lags. Additionally, we obtain similar estimates when we use the group-mean fully modi…ed OLS (FMOLS) procedure of Pedroni (2000 Pedroni ( , 2004 and the two-step estimator of Breitung (2005) .
su¢ cient number of lags must be included in order to ensure that the …scal shocks are white noise. Therefore, we use Sims' (1980) likelihood ratio test to determine the appropriate number of lags to fully capture the dynamics for each country. For some countries, the test implies that equation (18) is appropriately speci…ed. However, for others, an additional lag is chosen. Therefore, we estimate the model with an additional lag,
whereB it andỸ it are the cointegrating vectors given by their linear counterparts and g i is the average change in output, all derived in Appendix A. A persistent, but negative …scal shock, perhaps created by a war, would imply a negative error in the …rst cointegrating relationship and rising lagged debt, implying a negative correlation between the two terms. Therefore, failure to include the lagged change in debt could bias the estimate on the coe¢ cient on the error correction terms. 21 Now, consider estimation of the coe¢ cients on the error correction terms in equation (19) . First, we use the estimated cointegrating parameters of the real interest rate and longrun value of the primary surplus to construct the error correction terms for each country, 20 The additional dynamics do not change the criterion for stability, given by equation (16), 3 r > 1 1 , but modify slightly the criterion for 1 , which becomes 1 (1 + r)
5 < 1 + 4 r, and add a third criterion, given by 1 < 4 (1 + r) < 1: 21 Using long US samples of one and two centuries that highlight the role of wars, Bohn (2008) expresses the …scal rule in terms of the primary surplus and debt as a fraction of output, and …nds it necessary to add HP-…ltered measures of transitory values of the variables to distinguish between the response of the primary surplus to permanent and transitory shocks and reduce "omitted variables bias." Transitory, but persistent government spending, as associated with a war, would be accompanied by rising debt implying that the residual would be low when debt is high relative to the surplus. The error correction model deals with this by adding lagged changes of the model variables. In this example, the lagged change in debt would be high in a war and would play the role of Bohn's transitory military spending, and the lagged change in output would play the role of Bohn's HP-…ltered output.
yielding an equation in which all the variables are stationary. Asymptotically, the fact that we use the estimated error correction terms rather than the true error correction terms in (19) does not a¤ect the standard properties of our estimates due to the super-consistency properties of the estimator of the cointegrating relationships. 22 After constructing the error correction terms, we estimate the coe¢ cients of the error correction model, augmented with lagged changes in variables, providing estimates for 1 ; is statistically signi…cantly larger than 1 1 . 24 Additionally, our results imply that the coe¢ cient on lagged debt, 3 , is 0:0727, which is similar in magnitude to those obtained by Bohn (2008) and Mendoza and Ostry (2008) . 25 Moreover, our estimates imply that that the long-run value of the primary surplus, '
, is 1:54% of GDP. The long-run value of debt,
, is 71:62% of GDP, which is below reasonable values for the …scal limit.
We also present parameter estimates for each individual country in Table 6 . Our inference for each country's …scal rule is weaker. We …nd that each country's 3i r i is larger than 1 1i , 22 See Engle and Granger (1987), Toda and Phillips (1993) and Urbain (1992) for the properties of estimators in cointegrated systems. 23 They show that when the parameters of interest are heterogeneous, the group-mean procedure provides consistent estimates, whereas the pool panel procedures give inconsistent estimates. 24 We obtain the same result when we use the hierarchical Bayes procedure of Hsiao et al. (1999) and the weighted method of Swamy (1980) (also referred as the empirical Bayes procedure). Additionally, our results satisfy the criterion on 1 ( 1 (1 + r) 4 r 5 = 0:6019 < 1) ; and the criterion on 4 ( 4 (1 + r) = 0:0617 < 1) : Since these criteria are necessay but not su¢ cient, we compute the three roots with our estimates of parameter values, which satisfy these restrictions, con…rming that all roots are real, positive, and less than unity. 25 Bohn's (2008) At …rst glance the estimated coe¢ cient on output, or equivalently the estimated coe¢ -cient on the long-run value for the primary surplus, 2 , might seem to have the wrong sign.
An alternative and equivalent expression of the error correction model is more intuitive.
Using results in Appendix A, the …scal rule in equation (18) can also be written as
which implies that the primary surplus increases whenever the lagged primary surplus is below its long-run value and whenever lagged debt service is above its long-run value. As shown in the Appendix A, the criterion
Given that ' i > 0; the value for 2i must be negative.
We have not allowed estimates of the parameters of the error correction model to change as the monetary union has evolved over time. However, if the coe¢ cients in the cointegrating relationships had changed and no account were taken for the change, then we should not have rejected the null of no cointegration. 26 The values for the coe¢ cients on the error correction terms could have changed. To test for a change in 1 ;
; and 3 r , we break the sample into two sub-periods, the pre-EMU era (1970 1998 ) and the post-EMU era (1999 2011). Table 7 26 For example, assume that there is an unmodelled change in'. The residuals in (17) will be non-stationary and cointegration would be rejected.
shows that is signi…cantly less than zero. In the pre-EMU era, the standard errors are too high to yield signi…cance for both hypothesis tests. 27 In the post-EMU era, is not signi…cantly less than zero. Therefore, the signs and magnitudes in the split-samples are consistent with our hypothesis that the …scal rule has been responsible, but the sample sizes are too short to yield signi…cance. 28 In summary, our group-mean panel results imply that primary surpluses in the EMU countries have been su¢ ciently responsive to lagged debt to satisfy the criteria for the …scal rule to have been responsible. When we reduce the size of the sample, either by estimating individual-country …scal rules or by splitting the sample, we retain the magnitudes necessary for responsibility, but we do not always get signi…cance.
Conclusion
The …rst contribution of the paper is theoretical. We assume that the …scal authority follows a rule and establish criteria for the rule to satisfy the government's intertemporal budget constraint and eliminate explosive behavior of debt and the primary surplus relative to output. We de…ne this rule as responsible, and we solve for the restrictions on parameter 27 The sub-samples are not long enough to allow reliable inference. Most of our panel techniques require the time series dimension to be substantially larger than the cross-section dimension, and we lose this when we split the sample. 28 Afonso (2008) and Annett (2006) , who use a similar EMU data set, but di¤erent empirical techniques, do not …nd evidence for a change in …scal policy as the monetary union evolved over time.
values necessary for the …scal rule to be responsible. We …nd that the response of the primary surplus to debt must be large enough to render the system, expressed as long-run equilibrium deviations (equivalently cointegrating vectors), globally stable. This modi…es Bohn's (1998 Bohn's ( , 2008 condition, in which he de…nes a sustainable …scal rule in the absence of …scal limits as one which satis…es the government's intertemporal budget constraint. Our additional criterion in the presence of …scal limits, requires a larger response of the primary surplus to government debt. Moreover, consideration of non-explosive behavior, required by …scal limits, restores cointegration as a requirement for a responsible …scal rule, since debt, the primary surplus, and GDP must reach stable long-run relationships with each other.
These results imply two empirically testable criteria for a responsible …scal rule. The …rst is cointegration, and the second is the magnitude of the responsiveness of the primary surplus to lagged debt in the …scal rule.
Our theoretical contribution brings the literature on …scal sustainability full circle. Trehan and Walsh (1991) summarized requirements for …scal policy to satisfy the government's intertemporal budget constraint as those which we present to satisfy both the intertemporal budget constraint and …scal limits. Bohn (2007) argued that those requirements were too strong to satisfy the government's intertemporal budget constraint alone. We show that adding …scal limits restores those original criteria.
The second contribution of the paper is empirical. We test for cointegration, and we estimate the parameters of the …scal rule for a panel of eleven EMU countries over the period of 1970-2011, using panel techniques that allow for heterogeneity across the countries.
We …nd that over the sample period, the data exhibits the required cointegration and the required responsiveness of the primary surplus to lagged debt for the …scal rule to have been responsible.
However, even a country following a responsible …scal rule can experience a …scal solvency crisis. Bad luck, experienced as a string of negative …scal shocks together with the policy response to those shocks, can send the system onto a path which is expected to violate the …scal limit, creating a solvency crisis. Or policy makers can make future promises which create an insolvent …scal position into which creditors refuse to lend. This analysis suggests that the recent …nancial turmoil in several EMU countries is not a consequence of explosive …scal rules, but rather of adverse …scal shocks or insolvent future promises.
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Appendix
A. Model with a Linear Trend
The model consists of equations (1), and (6), with the equation for output growth is expressed as
where g is the average change in output, such that Since output changes on average by g, the primary surplus changes on average by' g; and debt changes on average by' g r : Di¤erencing and subtracting the linear trend in the surplus and debt from equations (1) and (6), respectively, yields
To solve for long-run equilibrium relationships, set the equations above equal to zero, with disturbances at their expected values of zero, to yield
Therefore, compared with the theoretical model, which has a geometric trend, the empirical model, estimated with a linear trend over the …nite sample, yields cointegrating vectors with constants and di¤erent coe¢ cients. At mean values, the cointegrating relationships are identical to those in the model with a geometric trend.
To prove this, express the …rst equilibrium relationship at the mean as
Dividing both sides by b yields
The second cointegrating vector is obtained by setting equation (21) equal to zero, with shocks at their expected value of zero. Evaluating at the mean yields
Substitute for b from equation (24) and use g' = s to yield
Dividing by y and rearranging yields Using equations (21), (22) , and (23), the error correction model can be expressed as
De…ning deviations from cointegrating vectors and long-run relationships as
we can rewrite the dynamic system in terms of the cointegrating vectors and the long-run relationship of output as
Substituting for'; the characteristic equation is identical to that for the theoretical model with the geometric trend. Therefore, the requirements for global stability are identical. The requirement that 3 r > 1 1 is simply the requirement that
The loading on the second error correction term in equation (25) must be positive.
B. Data Appendix
Data is primarily from the OECD database, and for missing years data is obtained from the ECB's AMECO database. For the nominal primary surplus we use the general government primary balances (OECD Annex Table 29 ) and for nominal debt we use the general government gross …nancial liabilities (OECD Annex Table 33 Note: t IP S is the group mean t-statistic proposed by Im et al. (2003) , t BD rob is the OLS robust t-statistic proposed by Breitung and Das (2005) , t M P a and t M P b are the tstatistics based on the factor model proposed by Moon and Perron (2004) and t CIP S is the test proposed by Pesaran (2007) . They all test the null of a unit root against the alternative of stationarity. All tests include individual speci…c constants and trends. For the t IP S , t BD rob , t M P a and t M P b tests, the null is rejected if t < 1:64 and for the t CIP S test, the null is rejected if t CIP S < 2:85: No test statistic rejects the null at the 5 percent level. The statistics are distributed standard normal. They test the null hypothesis of no cointegration against the alternative of cointegration. All the tests include individual speci…c …xed e¤ects and common time e¤ects. The test statistics with ** reject the null hypothesis at the 5 percent level. The 5 percent critical value is -1.64. Note: r and' are the group-mean panel estimates of the cointegrating parameters. They include individual speci…c e¤ects and common time e¤ects. The ** indicate statistical signi…cance at the 5 percent level. are the group-mean panel estimates for the loadings on the error correction terms. 4 , 5 and 6 are the group-mean panel estimates for the coe¢ cients on the lagged change in surplus, the lagged change in debt and the lagged change in output, respectively. The ** indicate statistical signi…cance at the 5 percent level. Note: The ** indicate statistical signi…cance at the 5 percent level. 
